agency. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under these principles, the Court defers to a reasonable
agency interpretation only if the statute is silent or ambiguous.
Castellon-Contreras v. INS, 45 F.3d 149, 153, (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Chevron,
supra, at 843-44). As evidenced by this very decision, and the decisions of this
Board which have preceded it, the term “extreme” in the statute is not readily
defined, at least in its application. Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 882 (BIA
1993) (stating that “extreme hardship” is not a definable term of fixed and
inflexible content or meaning and depends on the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case).
It is worth noting that when the first suspension provision was enacted in
1940, the required showing was only “serious economic detriment to a citi
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zen or legally resident alien who is the spouse, parent, or minor child of such
deportable alien.” Act of June 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 670. In 1952, for a variety of
reasons, the socio-political pendulum swung in the opposite direction and
Congress enacted the far more restrictive standard of “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship.” See Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 244(a)(1),
66 Stat. 163, (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1958)). Ten years later, Con-
gress retreated from this position, and while it retained “exceptional and
extremely unusual” as the standard for relief under section 244(a)(2) of the
Act, it required only “extreme hardship” for section 244(a)(1) cases. See Act
of October 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247, (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1964)).
In examining the term “extreme,” the dissent contrasts it against other
descriptive language Congress might have chosen to convey the level of
hardship required to warrant consideration for suspension of deportation
under section 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)(1994). The dissent
posits that, according to a “common definition [”extreme"] means ‘existing
in a very high degree,’ ‘most advanced,’ or ‘very pronounced or exces
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sive.’"That may be; however, in my view, it does little to advance the analy
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sis, as the dissent contravenes yet another principle of statutory construction:
that a statute must be construed to give meaningful effect to all its provisions.
Whole act analysis compels a reasonable agency interpretation to take into
account the nature and design of the statute as a whole. K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); see also COIT Independent Joint
Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561 (1989) (stating
that “whole statute” interpretation dictates that statutory sections should be
read in harmony to achieve a harmonious whole).
Absent from the dissent’s analysis is any meaningful comparative consid
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eration of the second subsection in the statutory section under scrutiny, sec
-
tion 244(a)(2), which requires a showing of “exceptional and extremely
unusual” hardship. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (hold
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ing that the Board may not blur the distinctions between two related but sepa
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rate statutory standards or reduce them into one); Matter of Hou,20I&N
398
Interim Decision #3280